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The 2008–09 global economic crisis hit the Asian Tiger economies of Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China 
hard, despite their strong macroeconomic fundamentals and sound financial sys-
tems. Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, these economies had strengthened 
current accounts and had significant expansion in foreign reserves. Meanwhile, 
their financial systems had become more resilient, with the restructuring of balance 
sheets and the enhancement of surveillance. Nevertheless, each Tiger economy 
experienced a collapse in exports and an attendant sharp contraction of GDP in 
the second half of 2008 as global demand faltered. The GDP for Hong Kong, 
China; the Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China contracted by 
-7.8 percent, -4.2 percent, -9.5 percent, and -10.1 percent, respectively, in the 
first quarter of 2009. Such developments reflect the small open nature of these 
economies and highlight their vulnerability to external shocks.1 There were also 
signs of financial contagion in the case of the Republic of Korea, which at one 
juncture suffered from currency turmoil.2
Subsequently, toward the end of 2009, the Asian Tiger economies rapidly 
rebounded, with the support of swift domestic policy responses on both the fiscal 
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7
This chapter consolidates two ADBI working papers by Chow (2010) and Ha, Lee, and Sumulong 
(2010).
1. Merchandise exports as a percentage of GDP for Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; 
Singapore; and Taipei,China are 169 percent, 45 percent, 185 percent, and 65 percent, respectively.
2. Hence, this chapter places special emphasis on the case of the Republic of Korea.
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and monetary fronts. Fiscal stimulus measures amounted to around 2.6 percent of 
GDP for this group of countries, and by the first half of 2009, nearly 40 percent 
of the fiscal stimulus had been implemented (IMF 2009). Meanwhile, massive 
policy stimulation in the advanced countries led to the normalization of global 
trade, while public support of their financial sectors lifted financial market senti-
ment. The Asian Tiger economies on average grew 4.8 percent from 2010 to 2013 
(IMF 2014). There has also been a resurgence of private capital flows into these 
economies in search of high-yielding investments, underscoring international 
investor optimism about the region’s growth prospects. Consequently, stock prices 
and property prices have been trending up amid the flood of global liquidity 
inflows, and these developments have raised concerns about the emergence of 
asset-price bubbles in these economies.
By contrast, growth in the major advanced economies was modest at 3 percent 
in 2010. The recovery was weighed down by various factors such as high unemploy-
ment rates, large public debt, difficult financial conditions, and weak household 
balance sheets. In light of these challenges, the advanced economies experienced 
sluggish growth of 1.5 percent from 2011 to 2013 (see IMF 2014). Consequently, 
their demand for Asian exports will most likely remain subdued in comparison 
with the precrisis period. Hence to sustain the ongoing economic recovery, it 
is imperative for the Asian Tiger economies to rely on domestic and regional 
demand for growth. In other words, policymakers in these economies will need 
to work toward the rebalancing of demand from economies, such as the United 
States, that have large current account deficits in relation to the Asian countries 
that have large current account surpluses. Even though these imbalances did not 
directly cause the recent global turmoil, they still pose the risk of sparking another 
financial crisis, as the imbalances are deemed to be unsustainable and may unwind 
in a disorderly manner, involving a sharp fall in the U.S. dollar or a protracted 
economic downturn in the industrialized countries, either of which would have 
adverse consequences for the world economy, not least the Asian Tiger economies.
Addressing the issue of current account imbalances, however, requires a better 
understanding of the causes. Asia’s current account surpluses grew rapidly after 
the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, as a result of declining domestic demand. 
Investment rates fell sharply in the crisis-hit economies as well as in the region’s 
newly industrialized economies (Lee and McKibbin 2007). External imbal-
ances are not just an external problem and should not be judged solely by their 
size. In open economies, current account imbalances can naturally emerge from 
country-specific macroeconomic and financial factors; as long as the imbalances 
reflect economic fundamentals, these cannot be considered bad. However, cur-
rent account imbalances can also result from internal microeconomic imbalances 
or from domestic distortions caused by market inefficiencies or public policies 
(Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti 2009). The domestic saving-investment (S-I) 
imbalance, as well as policies on export orientation, exchange rates, and reserve 
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management, can all have an impact on external imbalances. These internal 
factors suggest that exchange-rate adjustments alone will not bring about bal-
anced growth.
Evolution of Saving and Investment
From 2000 to 2008 the overall gross national saving rate remained high, at an 
average rate of 31 percent of GDP. This high level of savings could be attributed 
to key factors that influence long-term development in private saving rates, such 
as economic growth, demography, precautionary savings by firms in the after-
math of the Asian financial crisis, and the level of financial uncertainty faced 
by households (see Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén 2000). Over the same 
period, overall gross investment hovered around a lower mean level of 26 percent 
of GDP. Possible explanations for the lower level of investment following the 
Asian crisis include the relocation of production facilities from the Asian Tiger 
economies to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the shift in emphasis from 
capital-intensive production to an information technology– and knowledge-
based economy (IMF 2005). In any case, both saving and investment rates fell 
in 2009 by about 3 and 5 percent, respectively, in the aftermath of the global 
economic crisis. The resulting S-I balance stayed positive throughout the period 
and widened by only 2 percent of GDP between 2000 and 2009. Concomitantly, 
the current account surplus shrank from more than 5 percent to around 4 per-
cent in 2008 at the onset of the crisis, as the massive slowdown in exports was 
outweighed by an even sharper deceleration in imports. However, the dip proved 
temporary, as the current account surplus climbed to more than 6 percent of 
GDP in 2009.
Do these movements in overall rates mask variations across the countries? In 
what follows, we provide a series of charts that give an overview of the evolution 
of saving and investment in the individual countries. Figure 7-1 depicts trends 
in gross national saving and gross domestic investment, and figure 7-2 shows the 
current account balance, for each of the Asian Tigers.
The S-I balance in both the Republic of Korea and Singapore first increased and 
then narrowed over the past decade (figure 7-1). In the Republic of Korea, gross 
domestic investment overtook gross domestic saving, producing a negative cur-
rent account balance in 2008 (figure 7-2).3 In comparison, the S-I balance for 
Hong Kong, China and Taipei,China broadened between 2000 and 2008. In 
particular, Hong Kong, China’s S-I gap widened considerably, from 4 percent to 
14 percent of its GDP, over this period. From the external perspective, figure 7-2 
3. The Economist Intelligence Unit revised its rating methodology in the second quarter of 
2006, and until the third quarter of 2008 it classified the Republic of Korea as low risk, which may 
have contributed to the pickup in investment in 2008. This trend could very well have continued 
had the global financial crisis not erupted.
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Percent of GDP
Hong Kong, China Republic of Korea
Singapore Taipei,China 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database, April 2013. 
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Figure 7-1. Gross National Saving and Gross Domestic Investment,  
as Share of GDP, Asian Tigers, 2000–12
shows that the current account surplus in Hong Kong, China exhibited the most 
per sistent climb over the past decade. Between 2000 and 2008, the average 
current account surplus amounted to 10.9 percent, 1.7 percent, 19.8 percent, 
and 16.5 percent of GDP for Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Singa-
pore; and Taipei,China, respectively, with the corresponding coefficient of varia-
tion at 0.3, 0.8, 0.3, and 0.2. Although the Republic of Korea has the lowest 
mean current account surplus during this period, it has the highest volatility 
among the four economies.
A better understanding of the determinants of the trends in gross saving and 
investment would require a breakdown of the macroeconomic-level data into 
sectoral-level data. Unfortunately, published data on the composition of saving 
and investment in terms of government, corporate, and household sectors are 
available only for the Republic of Korea. Although the dichotomy between public 
and private domestic investment is available for the three other Asian Tiger econ-
omies, there are no official data on public and private saving. To gain a tentative 
indication of the trends in public versus private saving rates, we compute public 
saving as the difference between total government revenue and government con-
sumption. Private saving is then estimated as the residual from gross saving. The 
evolution of gross national saving and its various components for the individual 
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economies are plotted in figure 7-3, and the corresponding data for investment 
are found in figure 7-4.
We observe from figure 7-3 that gross national saving in Hong Kong, China and 
Taipei,China rose by 3 and 4 percent of GDP, respectively, over the past decade. 
Although the increase in Hong Kong, China was largely driven by public saving, 
which went up by more than 2 percent of GDP, it was private saving, which rose 
by 8 percent of GDP, that led to higher gross saving in Taipei,China. By contrast, 
gross national saving in the Republic of Korea fell from 33 percent of GDP to 
31 percent of GDP between 2000 and 2007 as household saving declined by more 
than half, from 9 percent to 4 percent. Government saving held steady at around 
10 percent of GDP, while corporate saving increased by 3 percent of GDP over 
the same period.4 As for Singapore, there was hardly any change in gross national 
Percent of GDP 
Hong Kong, China Republic of Korea
Singapore Taipei,China 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics database.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
0
1
2
3
4
5
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
0
4
8
12
16
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
Figure 7-2. Current Account Balance as Share of GDP, Asian Tigers, 2000–12
4. The leverage ratios of Korean firms declined dramatically after the Asian financial crisis. Total 
borrowings and bonds payable of manufacturing firms reached 50.1 percent of total assets in 1998; 
by 2008, this ratio had fallen to about 26.3 percent of total assets. Debt ratios (defined as the ratio 
of total liabilities to stockholders’ equity) of manufacturing firms also declined substantially, from 
more than 300 percent to about 100 percent in the same period.
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saving between 2000 and 2008. Public saving, which tended to be the driving force 
of the saving process in Singapore, fell by about 6 percent, but this was completely 
offset by an increase in private saving.
Fluctuations in investment from 2000 to 2008 also differed somewhat across 
the Asian Tiger economies (see figure 7-4). Gross domestic investment exhibited a 
downward trend over the past decade for Hong Kong, China and Taipei,China. The 
decline in both economies can be attributed to a drop in public investment and, 
 in the case of Hong Kong, China, a slip in private investment, as well. By contrast, 
gross domestic investment in the Republic of Korea held steady over the period, 
and its composition remained broadly unchanged from 2000. As for Singapore, the 
gross domestic investment initially slowed and then picked up, despite a continu-
ous decline in public investment. Singapore’s high private investment rate is partly 
a result of its development strategy of attracting export-oriented foreign firms.
Percent of GDP
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Source: Data from Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong, China; Bank of Korea; Ministry
of Trade and Industry, Singapore; and Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics,
Taipei,China.
Figure 7-3. Components of National Saving as Share of GDP, by Sector,  
Asian Tigers, 2002–12
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In summary, savings have generally been higher than investment in the past 
decade for the Asian Tiger economies. Over the longer term, however, the saving 
rates in these economies are likely to decline as household consumption increases 
along with the projected shifts in demographic profiles. With reference to the 
life-cycle hypothesis, an aging population tends to put downward pressure on 
the saving rate as there is a tendency for the elderly to consume out of savings 
on retirement. In addition, spending on social services for the elderly, coupled 
with a lower tax base owing to a smaller workforce, implies a reduction in public 
savings. The findings of an IMF (2005) study that uses panel regression analysis 
confirm that the old-age dependency ratio—the ratio of those aged sixty-five and 
Percent of GDP
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Figure 7-4. Components of Domestic Investment as Share of GDP, by Sector,  
Asian Tigers, 2000–12
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over to the population aged fifteen to sixty-four—is negatively associated with 
savings. In the study, each percentage-point increase in the elderly dependency ratio 
is estimated to raise consumption by 3 percentage points of GDP, suggesting that 
life-cycle factors do have a significant effect on the savings rate.
Figure 7-5 depicts the past and projected old-age dependency ratio for the 
Asian Tiger economies. We observe that, without exception, the elderly depen-
dency ratio has been going up and is likely to climb further.5 The hitherto high 
saving rates in these economies could partly be attributed to higher household 
saving as people prepare for retirement. More-developed financial sectors could 
thus help reduce the precautionary motive for saving. Looking ahead, we infer 
that ongoing changes in the age composition of the population in these econo-
mies are likely to increase the consumption-to-GDP ratio, notwithstanding 
bequest motives. Such adjustments are nonetheless likely to be gradual even as 
shifts in demographic profiles occur only slowly (Eichengreen 2006).
Role of Exchange-Rate Adjustment
How do fluctuations in the exchange rate affect the current account balance? 
A higher exchange-rate value makes local goods dearer in foreign currency terms 
and, at the same time, foreign goods cheaper in domestic currency terms. Hence 
5. Demographic change in Singapore was supposed to produce one of the world’s most rapidly 
aging populations. However, the transition toward an older population structure was slowed by 
large-scale immigration and importation of foreign talent and workers.
Percent 
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an appreciation of the domestic currency is expected to dampen exports and 
boost imports, effectively reducing the trade surplus. Since net exports form the 
main component of the current account surplus of the Asian Tiger economies, a 
domestic currency appreciation would tend to narrow the positive S-I balance.
S-I Balance and the Exchange Rate
In this subsection, we investigate how developments in the S-I balance of the Asian 
Tiger economies relate to fluctuations in the value of their domestic currency. 
Figure 7-6 depicts the real effective exchange rate superimposed on the S-I balance 
from 1990 to 2009 for the individual economies.
A visual inspection of figure 7-6 suggests an apparent negative association 
between the level of the real effective exchange rate and the magnitude of the 
S-I  balance. In general, a lower level of the real effective exchange rate tends to be 
associated with a higher level in the S-I balance. This negative relationship is par-
ticularly evident in the case of Hong Kong, China and Singapore and is discern-
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Figure 7-6. Real Effective Exchange Rate and S-I Balance as Share of GDP,  
Asian Tigers, 2000–2012
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ible for the Republic of Korea. The figure reveals a persistent decline in the Hong 
Kong dollar in real effective terms over the past decade. During this period, the 
S-I balance in Hong Kong, China rose steadily. The real effective exchange rate 
of the Singapore dollar initially fell, reaching a trough in 2005, and then started 
to climb. Interestingly, the magnitude of the S-I balance in Singapore seems to 
mirror these movements in the exchange rate but with a lag. The strengthening 
of the Korean won in real effective terms picked up pace after 2004, accompa-
nied by a lowering of the S-I balance in the recent period. Taipei,China is the 
only exception. We see from figure 7-6 that the depreciation in its real effective 
exchange rate does not appear to have a consistent relationship with the level 
of the S-I balance.
However, when considering the magnitude of response of the S-I balance to 
exchange-rate changes, the relevant relationship is not the one between the levels 
of the variables but that between the movements in these variables. For a tentative 
indication of the strength of linear association between changes in the S-I gap 
and changes in the real effective exchange rate, we examine the cross-correlation 
coefficients between the first differences of the two variables for the individual 
economies. First, we observe from figure 7-7 that the correlation coefficients at 
leads are in general not more significant that those at lags, implying that fluc-
tuations in the real effective exchange rate do not exhibit a dominant leading 
relationship over changes in the S-I balance in all four economies. Second, the 
correlation coefficients occurring at lead time are not predominantly negative. 
These findings suggest that a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate in 
the Asian Tiger economies may not necessarily be linked to an increment in the 
S-I balance in the short run. We note that these cross-correlation coefficients 
are preliminary rough estimates as they are computed over a small number of 
time periods. In what follows, we carry out a more detailed econometric analysis 
of the impact of exchange-rate changes on the current account balance in the 
Republic of Korea.
Econometric Analysis of the Republic of Korea’s Current Account
The Republic of Korea’s current account seems to be correlated with major 
economic variables such as exchange rates, national GDP, and world GDP.6 To 
determine the exact magnitude of the effects of these variables, we conducted 
econometric analyses using the dynamic ordinary least squares method. Specifi-
cally, we set up the following models for exports and imports. Equation 7-1 is for 
exports, where the real effective exchange rate and world GDP are the determi-
nants. Equation 7-2 is for imports, where the real effective exchange rate and the 
Republic of Korea’s GDP are the main determinants.
6. This subsection draws from Ha, Lee, and Sumulong (2010).
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ex reer wgdp reer wgdp ut t t reer j t j wgdp j t j t
j p
p
j p
p
∑∑= α + β + β + β ∆ + β ∆ +
- -
=-=-
(7-1) ,1 2 , ,
im reer gdp reer gdp ut t t reer j t j gdp j t j t
j p
p
j p
p
∑∑= α + β + β + β ∆ + β ∆ +
- -
=-=-
(7-2) .1 2 , ,
Here, ex is export volumes, im is import volumes, reer is real effective exchange 
rate, wgdp is world GDP, and gdp is the Republic of Korea’s GDP. All variables 
are in natural logs and use quarterly data from various sources.7 Equations 7-1 
and 7-2 are estimated with p = 2.
7. The data for Korean export volumes, import volumes, and GDP have been obtained from 
the Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp). Real effective 
exchange rates for the Republic of Korea, Dubai crude oil prices, and world GDP growth rates have 
been obtained from Bloomberg, and real effective exchange rates for Japan from the International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics database.
Figure 7-7. Cross-Correlations between Changes in Real Effective Exchange Rate 
and Changes in S-I Balance, Asian Tigers, 2000–08
 Hong Kong, China Republic of Korea
Singapore Taipei,China 
Source: Author’s calculations.
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The results for equation 7-1 are summarized in table 7-1. The first column is 
the specification for equation 7-1 with the full sample. The results show that the 
Republic of Korea’s exports are significantly correlated with exchange rates and 
world GDP, as predicted by economic theory. However, the coefficient of the 
exchange rate, indicating the exchange-rate elasticity of exports, is much smaller 
(-0.16) than that of world GDP (3.44). This means that a 1 percent depreciation 
in the real effective exchange rate will increase the Republic of Korea’s exports 
by 0.16 percent,8 whereas a 1 percent increase in world GDP will increase the 
Republic of Korea’s exports by 3.44 percent.
Overall, these results may have been influenced by drastic changes in the vari-
ables during the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis and the 2008–09 global financial 
crisis. If a stable period were considered, the same econometric model would give 
a totally different picture. The second column in table 7-1 shows the results for 
equation 7-1 for the noncrisis period covering 2000Q4–2007Q2. For this sample, 
the effect of the exchange rate on exports has virtually no significance, while world 
GDP has a strong effect.9 During this noncrisis period, the won appreciated 
without reducing the pace of export growth.
Table 7-2 shows similar results for imports: while the real effective exchange 
rate and GDP are generally important determinants, the exchange-rate elasticity 
Table 7-1. Determinants of Exports, Republic of Korea, 1996–2007 a
Full sample Noncrisis periods only
Variable Coefficient t statistic Coefficient t statistic
Constant -11.74*** -28.54 -8.14*** -4.36
Real effective exchange rate -0.16** -1.97 -0.01 -0.02
World GDP 3.44*** 49.65 2.52*** 3.76
Adjusted R 2 0.9847 0.9838
Sample (adjusted) 1996Q4–2009Q2 2000Q4–2007Q2
N 51 27
Source: Ha, Lee, and Sumulong (2010).
a. Coefficients on differences and lagged differences are not shown in the table.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
8. While a depreciation in the real effective exchange rate increases real exports, the impact of the 
nominal exchange rate on exports would also depend on the magnitude of exchange-rate pass-through, 
that is, the extent to which exporters change export prices in response to the exchange rate.
9. We also considered the real effective exchange rate of the Japanese yen as an additional deter-
minant of the Republic of Korea’s exports. The coefficient of  the Republic of Korea’s real effective 
exchange rate, reer, increased to -0.43 in the estimation with the full sample but remained insignifi-
cant in the noncrisis sample.
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is much smaller than the income elasticity. The first column corresponds to 
equation 7-2 with the full sample. The results show that a 1 percent appre-
ciation in the Republic of Korea’s real effective exchange rate raises imports by 
0.59 percent, whereas a 1 percent increase in the Republic of Korea’s GDP raises 
imports by 1.55 percent. Moreover, as seen in the second column of table 7-2, 
the effect of the exchange rate again becomes insignificant if one considers the 
noncrisis period.10 During the noncrisis period, exchange-rate appreciation did 
not increase domestic demand; the share of private consumption declined con-
tinuously, regardless of the direction of the won’s value.
These results suggest that exchange rates may not have a significantly meaning-
ful impact on exports and imports in the Republic of Korea; however, immense 
shocks such as financial crises do affect net exports. Moreover, the magnitude 
of the exchange-rate elasticity is smaller compared with variables such as world 
GDP or the Republic of Korea’s own GDP. These results are consistent with the 
findings of other research. For example, Y-I. Choi and J-R. Choi (2009) have shown 
that the effect of exchange-rate changes on exports and imports has diminished 
since 2000. This is partly owing to a significant weakening in the exchange-rate 
pass-through effect for export products, as more intermediate goods are outsourced 
globally. Similarly, Y-B. Kim and B-J. Kwark (2009) have shown that the effect 
of exchange rates on exports and investment has weakened significantly since the 
Asian financial crisis.
Table 7-2. Determinants of Imports, Republic of Korea, 1996–2007 a
Full sample (1) Noncrisis periods only (2)
Variable Coefficient t statistic Coefficient t statistic
Constant -17.16*** -29.49 -19.47*** -10.97
Real effective exchange rate 0.59*** 6.76 0.14 0.49
GDP 1.55*** 43.66 1.91*** 8.22
Adjusted R 2 0.9763 0.9516
Sample (adjusted) 1996Q1–2009Q1 2000Q4–2007Q2
No. of observations 53 27
Source: Ha, Lee, and Sumulong (2010).
a. Coefficients on differences and lagged differences are not shown in the table.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
10. The Dubai crude oil price was also considered as an additional determinant of Korean 
imports. The coefficient of the Republic of Korea’s real effective exchange rate, reer, increased to 
0.40 in the estimation with the full sample but remained insignificant in the noncrisis sample.
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Why did the appreciation in the Korean won not reach levels where net 
exports would disappear? This can be partly explained by a kind of dollar-recycling 
mechanism that works as follows: the goods account surplus pushes up the value 
of the won, inducing Korean firms and households to buy more foreign services; 
this widens the services account deficit and keeps the value of the won from 
appreciating as much. There has been a clear shift in the composition of the 
current account balance. Before 1997–98, the goods and services accounts moved 
in the same direction. Shortly after the Asian financial crisis, however, the services 
account started moving in the opposite direction from the goods account. From 
1999 to 2009, the accumulated goods account had a surplus of US$283.8 bil-
lion, while the services account had a deficit of US$117.3 billion. In other words, 
41.34 percent of the goods account surplus has been offset by the services account 
deficit. Granger causality tests (table 7-3) confirm that the services account deficit 
follows the goods account surplus, and not the other way around.
What kind of services brought about the deficit in the services account? Travel 
and other business services account for most of the deficit. Travel includes not 
just tourism but also the money that goes to Koreans studying overseas. Other 
business services consist of merchant and other trade-related services; adver-
tising; legal, accounting, and consulting services; and services between related 
enterprises.
The correlation between the goods account surplus and services account defi-
cit may reflect a basic structural problem in the Korean economy: the weakness 
of the services sector, such as education and business services. If the services sec-
tor had been strong enough, domestic demand as a percentage of GDP would 
have been larger, and the Republic of Korea would not have had to rely so much 
on the external sector. The services account deficit would have been smaller, 
while the goods account surplus would not have been so large. This points to 
another kind of imbalance in the economy, that between the goods sector and 
the services sector. This imbalance is reflected not only in the external accounts 
but also in the internal imbalance in domestic industries, as discussed later in 
this chapter.
Table 7-3. Pairwise Granger Causality Tests for Net Exports and Services Account 
Balance, Republic of Korea, 1980–2009 a
Sample: 1980M01–2009M11
Lags: 2
Null hypothesis: Obs. F statistic Prob.
SERVICES does not Granger Cause NX 357 1.07212 0.3434
NX does not Granger Cause SERVICES 16.2723 2.E-07
Source: Ha, Lee, and Sumulong (2010).
a. SERVICES stands for services account balance; NX is net exports.
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Targeting Final Demand in Regional Markets
The results of the empirical analysis in the previous section suggest that the poten-
tial role of the exchange rate in correcting current account imbalances is likely to 
be limited. In any case, exports have all along played a central role in the growth 
and development of the Asian Tiger economies. It is the export-oriented growth 
strategy that allowed the Asian Tiger economies to recover swiftly from the Asian 
financial crisis and facilitated their transformation into a surplus economy—that 
is, a net capital exporter. However, the very same strategy made the economies vul-
nerable to the 2008–09 global financial crisis. Overreliance on external demand 
made the Asian Tiger economies susceptible to a sharp fall in the industrial coun-
tries’ appetite for imported goods. As mentioned earlier, huge declines in exports 
resulted in economic contraction in all four economies in the first quarter of 2009. 
In other words, though the export-led growth strategy adopted by these economies 
had for decades proved highly successful in delivering strong output growth, 
it has resulted in greater volatility in GDP growth rates. The challenge faced 
by policymakers in these economies is to dampen the business-cycle fluctuations 
that were accentuated by recurrent shocks from the external environment. A key 
way to increase the resilience of an economy against exogenous shocks is through 
the diversification of its export markets.
The Asian Tiger economies had long diversified their trading partners, as 
reflected by the myriad free trade agreements they had entered into. In particular, 
the Asian Tiger economies had steadily increased trade with regional partners 
over the past decade. It is well recognized that the increase in intraregional trade 
in Asia was spurred by the global integration of the PRC’s economy.
Table 7-4 shows, for each Asian Tiger, the six most important trading partners 
based on bilateral exports trade data as well as the share of total exports each 
accounted for in 1990, 2008, and 2011. We observe from the table that, without 
exception, the regional economies, particularly the PRC, gained importance as 
trading partners of the Asian Tiger economies. However, the rise in intra regional 
trade can in large part be attributed to the growing intensity in vertical intra industry 
trade in Asia. The Asian Tiger economies are well integrated in the regional pro-
duction networks, which were strengthened by the emergence of the PRC as 
a manufacturing powerhouse. Specifically, these economies supply high-value 
intermediate components to the PRC for further processing and final assembly. 
The export profiles of the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taipei,China are 
similar—their export baskets weigh heavily on electronics components such as 
semiconductors and printed circuit boards bound for the PRC, the information 
technology assembly hub. In other words, trade flows with the regional countries 
are dominated by trade in parts and components rather than trade in final products.
Owing to the emergence of production networks, trade statistics no longer 
accurately reflect the dependence of Asian countries on extraregional demand. 
Gabor Pula and Thomas Peltonen (2009) used an updated Asian input-output 
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table to show that Asia has not decoupled from the rest of the world.11 In fact, a 
study by the Asian Development Bank (2007) estimates that only about a third 
of the final demand composition of Asia’s exports in 2006 can be accounted for 
by the region. Hence, it is not surprising that the recent collapse in demand of the 
end markets was transmitted to these economies involved in the different stages 
of the production process, resulting in the synchronized fall in trade. Not unlike 
the other Asian economies, the Asian Tiger economies are still heavily dependent 
on U.S. and the European Union markets in terms of final demand. Conse-
quently, the economic prospect of the Asian Tiger economies remains coupled to 
the upswings and downturns in the developed markets.
To reduce the vulnerability of export growth to demand shocks from the 
extraregional markets, the Asian Tiger economies need to gear their trade struc-
ture in terms of trade in final goods away from excessive dependence on the U.S. 
and eurozone markets toward regional markets. The aim would be to have intra-
regional trade based on trade in final products as an additional source of demand 
and growth for these economies. This means that intraregional trade should also 
be driven by consumption rather than by production alone. In this regard, the 
level of private consumption in Asia is likely to increase in view of rising affluence 
and standards of living in the fast-growing regional economies. In particular, the 
PRC offers some potential as a strong source of independent demand in view of 
the emergence of its large middle class with growing purchasing power.
An Asian Development Bank (2009) study provides evidence that domestic 
demand in the PRC is already starting to play a more prominent role in support-
ing exports from the Asian Tiger economies. In the study, total trade balance was 
decomposed into four major categories: basic products, construction materials, 
parts and components, and final goods. Since the figures for the first two categories 
are relatively small for the economies under consideration, we focus only on the 
last two categories in our analysis.
The PRC has been running current account surpluses with Hong Kong, China. 
This is not surprising given Hong Kong, China’s role as a major transshipment 
center for the PRC’s exports. Although the PRC also runs a trade surplus in final 
goods with Singapore, the magnitude is much smaller than the level of trade 
balance with the other three economies. By contrast, the PRC has been running 
current account deficits with the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China. Moreover, 
final goods are accounting for a growing share of the PRC’s trade deficit with 
these two economies over time. The magnitude of these deficits is significantly 
higher for Taipei,China, reflecting its cross-strait trade integration with the PRC. 
11. The same study found that Asia’s exports account for only approximately one-third of its 
GDP, far below the 50 percent dependence indicated by trade data. The exaggerated export depen-
dence is a result of the higher import content of exports that resulted from greater segmentation of 
the production process across the region.
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Considering the probable shifts in the PRC toward a bigger consumption basket 
that is typical in a rapidly growing economy, trade in final goods will quite likely 
play a more important role in driving the increase in trade between the PRC and 
the Asian Tiger economies going forward.
Increasing Reliance on Domestic Demand
Is there any room for the Asian Tiger economies to reduce dependence on export-
driven growth and to rebalance their economies toward more diversified sources 
of growth? After all, a key component of the transpacific rebalancing strategy is 
to implement structural policies that increase domestic demand. By examining 
the expenditure patterns in each country’s growth, we can explore the prospect of 
adopting a new growth model for the Asian Tiger economies that leverages more 
on the domestic economy.
We note at the outset that the size of net exports does not indicate the impor-
tance of foreign demand relative to domestic demand in an economy, particularly 
when there is a high propensity to import. Each domestic expenditure category, 
namely private consumption (C ), government consumption (G ), and investment 
(I ) (which comprises fixed capital formation as well as the increase in stocks), has 
its own import content. These import components are not shown separately but 
are aggregated and included in total imports (M ), which is, in turn, subtracted 
from total exports (X ) to produce net exports. Therefore, when considering drivers 
of growth, a better measure of the significance of external demand is the magni-
tude of total exports (rather than net exports) relative to the levels of domestic 
demand components.
To gauge the relative importance of foreign demand, we rewrite the standard 
national income accounting identity, GDP = C + G + I + X - M, as
C G I X GDP M+ + + = +(7-3) .
The left- and right-hand sides of equation 7-3 represent total demand and total 
supply in the economy, respectively. We see from equation 7-3 that an increase 
in any of the components of total demand could suffer from import leakage. An 
increase in C, G, I, or X would not only lead to higher production in that country 
but also increase production elsewhere (as reflected by an increase in imports). 
Although imports in themselves do not generate income in an economy, they are 
necessary to allow the country to export. Of course, imports are also critical for 
restoring external imbalances.
These economies are highly dependent on export demand, and the reliance 
on foreign demand has grown over the past decade in all four economies. In 
2008 external demand accounted for 70, 29, 76, and 45 percent, respectively, 
of total demand in Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Singapore; and 
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Taipei,China. In the case of Hong Kong, China and Singapore, external demand 
dominates domestic demand because reexports account for a significant portion 
of their total exports, exceeding 90 and 30 percent, respectively.
The extent to which the drivers of growth can be recalibrated depends on, 
among other things, the leverage each demand component exerts on output 
growth. For small open economies, a 1 percent increase in external demand is 
likely to have a greater impact on GDP than a corresponding 1 percent increase in, 
say, private consumption. After all, an exogenous increase in export demand will 
not only raise GDP in the current time period but will also have second-round 
effects of inducing growth in the domestic demand components in future time 
periods. Moreover, as explained earlier, an increase in any component of domes-
tic demand in such economies would tend to suffer from high import leakage. 
Hiroshi Osada (1998) provides estimates of the marginal propensity to import for 
Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China of 3.1, 
0.4, 1.5, and 0.6, respectively.12
With the exception of the Republic of Korea, fluctuations in GDP growth are 
closely associated with changes in external demand rather than changes in domestic 
demand. For instance, the dip in domestic demand growth in Hong Kong, China 
in 2005 did not make a significant dent in its GDP growth in that year. Similarly, 
the upsurge in domestic demand in 2008 in Singapore—which is largely a result 
of a jump in government consumption—did not seem to have any discernible 
effect on its GDP growth in that year. In sharp contrast, movements in GDP 
growth in the Republic of Korea do not closely follow the fluctuations in external 
demand but are significantly influenced by developments in domestic demand. 
As for Taipei,China, there is insufficient deviation in the pattern of fluctuations 
between domestic demand and external demand, so that we are unable to distin-
guish which is dominating GDP growth.
These findings are not in the least surprising when we consider the population 
size of the two city-states Hong Kong, China and Singapore, which in 2008 are 
only 7 million and 4.8 million, respectively. In other words, added to the prob-
lem of high import leakage, domestic demand in both these economies lacks the 
scale to drive output growth. These observations seem to attest to the fact that 
a domestic-led growth model is clearly unsuited for ultra-small open economies 
such as Hong Kong, China and Singapore. In comparison, the 2008 populations 
of the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China are 48.6 million and 23 million, 
respectively. Hence, there is greater potential for these two larger economies to 
have domestic-led growth.
12. The marginal propensity to import exceeds unity for Hong Kong, China and Singapore 
owing to the high proportion of reexports. The propensity to import goods for domestic production 
or consumption in Singapore is estimated to be around 0.8 (Peebles and Wilson 2002), while the 
propensity to import in Hong Kong, China, calculated from retained imports using more recent 
data, is approximately 0.5.
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Addressing Imbalances in the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China
In comparison with Hong Kong, China and Singapore, the relatively large popu-
lation sizes of the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China suggest more room for 
policy maneuvering with regard to increasing reliance on domestic demand in these 
two economies. Policy recommendations targeted at boosting domestic demand 
should be implemented to a greater extent in these two larger economies. Hence 
we focus our discussion in this section on the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China.
Republic of Korea: Internal Imbalances between Manufacturing and Services
As noted earlier, the imbalance between the manufacturing and services sectors 
is reflected in the behavior of the goods and services accounts.13 The weakness in 
the services sector is also reflected in its labor productivity trends. Table 7-5 shows 
that the employment share of services in the Republic of Korea has been increas-
ing over time—from 34.3 percent in 1970 to 65.2 percent in 2005. However, 
services’ share of value added has not been increasing at the same rate, rising 
from 44.29 percent to only 58.96 percent during the same period.14 This means 
that the labor productivity of the services sector has been decreasing over time. 
An analysis by Jong-Wha Lee (2005) has shown that while the manufacturing 
industry has enjoyed high productivity growth over the past few decades, Korean 
service industries, including the finance, insurance, real estate, construction, whole-
sale and retail trade, and restaurants and hotels sectors, have had little growth 
in productivity.15 The weakness in the services sector can be attributed to both 
Table 7-5. Employment in Services and Manufacturing Sectors as Share  
of Total Employment, Republic of Korea, 1970–2010
1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Services 34.3 38.6 47.7 54.8 61.2 65.2 57.7
Manufacturing 14.2 22.7 27.9 23.6 20.3 18.5 17.6
Other 51.5 38.7 24.4 21.6 18.5 16.3 24.7
Sources: Data from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (www.oecd.org/statistics/) 
and Korean Statistical Information Service (http://kosis.kr/eng/).
13. This subsection draws from Ha, Lee, and Sumulong (2010).
14. These figures are for current prices. If constant prices are used, the changes in services’ share 
become even smaller.
15. Lower productivity growth in the services sector relative to the manufacturing sector has 
been established since the seminal paper by Joe Baumol (1967). Increasingly unbalanced growth 
across sectors induces labor force reallocation toward stagnant sectors, which might eventually slow 
down aggregate GDP growth. That the Korean service industries have had relatively lower produc-
tivity growth is therefore not extraordinary. Nonetheless, the labor productivity growth differential 
between services and manufacturing has been much larger in the Republic of Korea than in other 
industrialized economies (see Lee 2005).
13884-07_CH07_3rdPgs.indd   202 2/15/15   12:59 PM
the asian tiger economies’ choices 203
knowledge-intensive services—in particular, education and business services—
and traditional services.
In education and business services, which are directly reflected in current 
account balances, the problem lies in the shortage and poor quality of supply. 
Although the shares of education and business services in value added have been 
increasing in nominal terms, these shares have actually been declining in real terms 
(that is, increases have resulted mainly from rising prices). From 1995 to 2008, 
education’s share in value added increased from 4.94 percent to 6.52 percent in 
current prices but decreased from 6.97 percent to 5.80 percent in constant prices. 
Business services give a similar picture: value added in current prices increased 
from 3.98 percent to 5.42 percent but decreased from 4.97 percent to 4.87 per-
cent in constant prices during the same period.
The Republic of Korea’s education problem is complicated and goes beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, the huge number of Koreans studying abroad 
suggests that the Republic of Korea’s education services cannot meet domestic 
demand. Korean students make up the bulk of overseas students in the United States 
(127,185 students in 2008, or 14.8 percent of the total), Canada (27,549 students 
in 2005, or 15.4 percent of the total), and the PRC (80,000 students). The story 
is similar in Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Given 
the size of the Republic of Korea’s population—about 50 million—these levels are 
rather surprising, and it is not difficult to guess how much money goes to these 
overseas students. Similarly, the supply of business services has been insufficient. 
In terms of value added, business services represented only 5.6 percent of GDP 
in 2005, compared with 11.5 percent in the United States and 7.7 percent in 
Japan. Employment in business services gives a similar picture: 6.8 percent of 
the Republic of Korea’s workers are in the business services sector, compared with 
11.7 percent in the United States and 10.5 percent in Japan.
By contrast, the supply of traditional services is more than sufficient. However, 
labor productivity in this sector is also relatively low. The productivity of the 
wholesale and retail trade sector and the restaurants and hotels sector was only 
22 percent of producer services in 2003. The productivity of social and personal 
services was also low, amounting to only 43 percent of producer services. This is 
a result of too much supply and too little demand.
The excess supply of traditional services arose from efforts to restructure 
the economy after the financial crisis. Most of the workers who were laid off 
shifted to the services industry, opening small restaurants and laundry shops 
or becoming taxi drivers. For example, the employment share of the restaurants 
and hotels sector increased from 9.46 percent in 1995 to 10.6 percent in 2008, 
though its share in value added (in current prices) decreased from 2.65 per cent 
to 2.39 percent. Meanwhile, the shortage of demand for traditional services 
has a lot to do with the declining income share of households. The share of 
households and private unincorporated enterprises in national income fell from 
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74.20 percent in 1996 to 64.09 percent in 2008. This drop of about 10 percent-
age points in household income has eroded the most important basis for domes-
tic consumption.
Corporate savings have been rising in the Republic of Korea. Reducing corpo-
rate savings and raising the corporate investment rate, particularly in the services 
industry, may help reduce internal imbalances if these foster restructuring within 
the services sector and raise the sector’s productivity. Although the services sector’s 
share in the total economy has been gradually diminishing in real terms, it still 
remains the largest sector in the economy.
Nevertheless, the country remains heavily reliant on services imports. Since 
records have been kept, starting in 1980, surpluses in the services account have 
been recorded only twice, in 1982–89 and in 1998. Business services other than 
transportation and financial services account for the bulk of the deficits in the 
past few years. The Republic of Korea needs to further develop its services sector 
to shift to a domestically supported growth strategy. This issue is more complex 
than it seems, since the low productivity of the services industry is closely related to 
massive hidden unemployment created by economic restructuring after the Asian 
financial crisis. Moreover, raising the demand for traditional services will require 
improvements in the share of household income. Since 88 percent of workers were 
employed by small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) as of 2005, promoting 
investment in these businesses will be critical.
To raise investment rates, the productivity of investment will have to be 
improved. Raising the productivity of SME investment, particularly in the services 
industry, where about 70 percent of workers are employed, will be important to 
rebalancing the Korean economy both internally and externally. This will require 
a reduction in widespread entry barriers in knowledge services and reforms to 
address the inefficient structure of traditional services. Investments in knowledge 
services such as education and business services should focus more on how to 
cope with growing global competition, whereas investments in traditional services 
should focus primarily on industry restructuring and reallocating excess workers 
to productive sectors.
The emergence of a large and rapidly growing urban middle class will be cru-
cial to increasing domestic demand. The expansion of the middle class will hinge 
on the dynamism of enterprises, especially SMEs. Increasing investment by SMEs 
will help reduce the internal imbalance between savings and investment. Further 
improvements in the investment climate are necessary to encourage greater invest-
ment and boost domestic demand. The upgrade in the Republic of Korea’s Doing 
Business (World Bank 2010) ranking for 2010 is largely owing to improvements 
in business startup procedures. Specifically, the number of procedures and the 
number of days required to start a business have been reduced. The minimum 
capital requirement and cost of starting a business have also been cut. The effects 
of these changes are expected to positively affect investment in the near term.
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Taipei,China: Economic Integration with the PRC
The Taipei,China economy, which grew at a rapid 9.2 percent year-on-year in the 
fourth quarter of 2009, has not only returned to precrisis growth levels but has 
also outperformed the other three Asian Tiger economies, whose corresponding 
growth figures are 2.6, 6.0, and 3.5 percent for Hong Kong, China; the Republic 
of Korea; and Singapore, respectively.16 Interestingly, the PRC featured promi-
nently in the rapid recovery of Taipei,China, even as exports of final goods to 
the PRC increased from 17.8 percent of total exports at the start of 2009 to 29.2 
percent in January 2010. Exports for final consumption in the PRC have been 
accounting for a growing share of the PRC’s trade deficit with Taipei,China over 
time. This reflects the increased penetration of Taipei,China’s goods in the PRC’s 
markets. Indeed, economic linkages between these two economies have prolif-
erated since the 1990.17 However, official figures tend to underestimate trade 
and investment flows between the two economies owing to various cross-border 
restrictions and political reasons. Taipei,China’s trade with and investment in 
the PRC have all along been partly intermediated through third parties such as 
Hong Kong, China; Japan; and Singapore. For that matter, Hong Kong, China 
also serves as a key intermediary to the rest of the world for the PRC’s external 
trade via reexports and offshore trade, as well as for raising international capital in 
the form of foreign direct investment, equity and bond financing, and syndicated 
loans to finance the PRC’s economic boom.
Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujii (2003) assessed the 
degree of real and financial integration between Taipei,China and the PRC (as 
well as Hong Kong, China) by testing for real interest rate parity, uncovered inter-
est rate parity, and real purchasing power parity. The authors found that these 
three parity conditions do hold over the long term, thereby providing empiri-
cal evidence of real and financial capital mobility as well as goods market inte-
gration between Taipei,China and the PRC, notwithstanding the presence 
of various forms of trade barriers and capital controls. As these impediments 
continue to be lifted, Taipei,China will gain economically through further inte-
gration of its economy with the PRC. Zhi Wang (2003) used a computable gen-
eral equilibrium model to show the positive effects of a free trade area in the 
region comprising the PRC; Hong Kong, China; and Taipei,China. Furthermore, 
Zhaoyong Zhang and Kiyotaka Sato (2007) found increasing structural symmetry 
among these three economies, which raises the potential of the region to become 
a candidate for monetary union. Taipei,China is likely to continue intensify-
ing its economic integration with the PRC, which will concomitantly reduce its 
dependence on extraregional markets, thereby aiding in global rebalancing.
16. All the year-on-year growth rate figures are flattered by a low base effect.
17. See Zhang, Xu, and Bin (2003) for a discussion of these linkages from a dynamic economic 
and political perspective.
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Policy Issues Pertaining to Rebalancing
We conclude this chapter by identifying policy options that apply in general 
to all the Asian Tiger economies attempting to rebalance their economies. It is 
important to note at the outset that boosting domestic demand through struc-
tural reforms in these economies would not necessarily require that they abandon 
the export-led growth strategy or turn back from economic openness. Rather, it 
is a policy imperative for the Asian Tiger economies to remain open to trade and 
capital flows for the following reasons: First, exports and output often mutually 
reinforce each other. For instance, exports are known to enhance long-run growth 
potential by accelerating the process of human capital accumulation, which in 
turn fosters growth (see Chuang 1998). Second, with reference to endogenous 
growth models, imports also tend to have a positive impact on labor productivity. 
It is well recognized that imports act as an important channel for foreign technol-
ogy and knowledge (Grossman and Helpman 1991). Third, retaining a degree 
of openness would encourage foreign direct investment inflows that contribute 
to domestic economic growth through channels such as the injection of greater 
competitive forces, the introduction of managerial innovations, and the restruc-
turing of underperforming firms.18
Notwithstanding the need to remain integrated with the world economy, it is 
in the interest of the Asian Tiger economies to increase their resilience against 
a possibly protracted period of subdued global demand conditions. After all, 
the unwinding of the huge global imbalances will quite likely require a pro-
longed period of adjustment to the global structure of supply and demand. 
The resolution of the imbalances does not imply that the Asian Tiger econo-
mies should all attempt to achieve balanced current accounts. Rather, what is 
required are policies that facilitate a more balanced structure of demand and 
growth within the economies. Given the mismatch between what the Asian 
Tiger economies produce and what they consume, such rebalancing will require 
major adjustments to their underlying economic structure. The rebalancing 
of growth toward domestic demand will thus be a complex structural process 
that is both difficult and time consuming (Adams and Park 2009). Never-
theless, there is scope for policy adjustments in the Asian Tiger economies in 
view of their strong economic fundamentals, fiscal latitude, and sound finan-
cial systems.
Furthermore, as pointed out by Li (2002), the erstwhile largely complemen-
tary economic relationship between the Asian Tiger economies and the PRC—in 
the form of the former supplying capital while the latter provides cheap labor—
18. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2002) for a review of 
empirical studies that show the positive impact of foreign direct investment on economic growth.
13884-07_CH07_3rdPgs.indd   206 2/15/15   12:59 PM
the asian tiger economies’ choices 207
is likely to evolve into a more competitive relationship in the future as the PRC 
moves up the value chain and progresses to higher-value-added industries. This 
suggests the Asian Tiger economies would also need to identify new areas of 
comparative advantage as well as seek out new areas of complementarities, espe-
cially those that would help them reduce their reliance on extraregional demand.
As the income level in the PRC rises, there is a growing culture of consumer-
ism, with shifts in spending patterns leading to higher consumption of luxury 
goods and services. For instance, strong demand from the PRC has been driving 
the recent recovery in the retail of branded watches and jewelry, while tourist 
arrivals in the Asian Tiger economies from the PRC have been growing rapidly 
(He, Cheung, and Chang 2007). In fact, this shift toward consumption whereby 
goods and services that had previously been regarded as luxuries are now viewed as 
necessities is also evident among the young urban generation in many tradition-
ally thrifty societies in the region. The Asian Tiger economies should continue to 
position themselves to capitalize on such ongoing increases in intraregional demand 
by reorientating their economic structures to tap into the changing spending 
patterns of prospering Asian economies.
In this regard, the Asian Tiger economies could maintain their dynamic and 
niche-based competitiveness by focusing on services exports, particularly by build-
ing up ancillary capabilities. Services sector productivity in Hong Kong, China; 
the Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China stands at approximately 84, 
27, 58 and 53, respectively, on a scale of 1 to 100, where 100 represents the pro-
ductivity level in the U.S. services sector. This suggests that there is ample room 
for further development of the services industry, and there is a need to eradicate 
existing policy distortions that favor the manufacturing industry.
Regulatory reforms in the services sector of the Asian Tiger economies would 
not only boost productivity in this sector but would also generate large gains 
in overall economic growth. Policy initiatives such as funding the upgrading 
of workers’ skills and expertise would result in a more knowledgeable and expe-
rienced workforce that would enhance the quality of services. Moreover, policies 
that induce firms to innovate in their work processes and incorporate the use 
of technology would lead to the improvement of work practices. Business invest-
ments targeting higher-value-added exportable services industries, such as finan-
cial services, medical tourism, and tertiary education, should also be encouraged, 
perhaps by offering tax breaks and incentives for regional expansion.
Apart from tradable services, service sector companies in the Asian Tiger 
economies that provide lower-value homegrown services such as retail, food and 
beverages, and personal grooming should also be granted greater tax incentives 
and a reduction in start-up costs. These industries are important for the stimulation 
of local consumption, as they generate employment and income for the major-
ity of the unskilled population. It follows that the long-held bias in favor of the 
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production of tradables over nontradables in these economies has to be reduced 
to bring about an increase in domestic consumer demand.19
Meanwhile, demand-side policies for reducing the imbalance between output 
and demand structures should aim at narrowing the income gap or at least arrest-
ing any further worsening of the income distribution.20 In particular, wage levels 
at the lower end of the income scale should be raised to alleviate the financial 
insecurity felt by local residents. Of course, this should be matched by an increase 
in their productivity such as through retraining efforts. For instance, in the case of 
Singapore, the authorities have begun to slow the upsurge of low-skilled migrant 
workers as their hitherto easy availability removes the incentives for companies 
to upgrade and places downward pressure on wages of the lower-skilled domestic 
workforce.
A rise in household consumption brought about by a reduction in precaution-
ary saving could also be induced through further development of the financial 
markets in Asian Tiger economies. For instance, a wider array of financial prod-
ucts could be offered to provide investment opportunities that give better rates 
of return. The provision of high-yielding saving vehicles would help raise house-
hold incomes. Moreover, the introduction of annuity products, health insurance 
schemes, and financial assistance programs for education would help ease the 
requisite level of saving for retirement, medical, and education purposes. Never-
theless, we note that in response to financial sector reforms in the aftermath of 
the Asian crisis, consumer credit expanded rapidly—particularly in the Republic 
of Korea and to a lesser extend in Taipei,China—leading to a jump in house-
hold delinquencies and nonperforming loans (IMF 2006a). Hence it is vital for 
the supervisory authorities to keep pace with new developments in the financial 
markets and to impose regulatory curbs on excessive consumer lending to ensure 
financial stability.
The economic integration of the PRC; Hong Kong, China; and Taipei,China 
economies is already taking place and is likely to intensify. In a similar vein, a 
way forward to advance transpacific rebalancing is to establish a common mar-
ket within the region over the long term, as this will raise intra-Asian demand 
and investment (Kawai 2009). Combining markets in the region could prove 
to be an effective strategy, given that the Asian economies, with few exceptions, 
do not individually have the scale to transition from externally driven to inter-
nally driven growth. The market enlargement would also induce growth through 
greater competition among firms, which will lead to productivity gains, and 
19. However, we are not advocating that the Asian Tiger economies adopt a new growth model 
whereby domestic demand consistently grows faster than output, as this would in the long term lead 
to unsustainably large trade deficits.
20. According to a study by the International Monetary Fund (2006b), the Gini coefficients for 
Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China rose between 1995 and 
2005, reaching 51.4, 33.1, 48.1, and 33.9 respectively in 2005.
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through efficiency gains for consumers (both final and intermediate), owing to 
an increase in the range of product choice. Drawing on the European experience 
with the 1992 European Single Market Programme, measures that would need to 
be taken include the adoption of a trade liberalization program,21 a lowering of 
the barriers to cross-border public procurement, enforcement of competition 
policy in all sectors, and elimination of hindrances to free movement of labor, 
capital, and services across member countries. Clearly, these initiatives will present 
many hurdles, such as historical legacy issues, territorial disputes, structural and 
institutional heterogeneity, and economic diversity. Nonetheless, the probable 
muted recovery in the advanced industrialized countries might just provide the 
necessary impetus to overcome the political, economic, and institutional chal-
lenges and accelerate efforts to establish a common market within Asia. Indeed, 
the Asian countries should make greater efforts to advance the establishment 
of a common market to better position themselves to benefit from the growing 
consumer and service demand in their own prospering region.
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